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Summary 
As a mall country among Georgia’s growth factors in future might well be foreign trade. 
The close cooperation with the EU within the European neighborhood policy centers on 
improving and facilitating trade between the partners. In 2006 the EU granted Georgia 
the GSP+ status which allows almost duty free imports of Georgian products in the EU. 
The extension of these trade preferences is negotiated in the realm of  a deep and com-
prehensive free trade agreement between the EU and Georgia.  
A closer look on the trade data reveal that  no trade enhancing effect of the GSP+ can 
be detected. The available trade data are significantly blurred by the inclusion of energy 
trade from Georgia which is likely only transit trade from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
If these export items and the movements of some raw material prices are removed from 
the data no export enhancing effect can be found. In addition, in the past the composi-
tion of Georgian exports remained highly biased towards raw materials and simple 
products. 
Improvements in export came from the export of services, namely tourism and pipe-
line transport service. Later is a significant source of income as well as the transfers of 
Georgian migrants working abroad? The export of pipeline service might increase in 
future further if envisaged additional pipelines over Georgian soil realize. Since these 
are mainly built with foreign capital increasing profit repatriation will result in higher 
capital outflows in future. 
At the moment the EU negotiates an deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
with Georgia which foresees beyond the abolition of tariffs the removal of all types of 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) . An important part of trade facilitation would be the adop-
tion of EU standards and norms which hinder at the moments Georgian exporters. Al-
though the EU is prepared to contribute with financial and technical help the removal of 
NTBs is costly for Georgian firms. The available studies forecast however significant 
positive effects from a comprehensive trade liberalization between the partners. Al-
though not captured by the mentioned feasibility studies on a comprehensive EU-
Georgian trade agreement, the strongest export enhancing effect for Georgia will only 
come from broadening the existing export basket. To do so best chances for Georgian 
firms are seen in transit services and the production of parts and components as a sup-
plier for multinational firms. The existing range of export goods does not exploit effec-




  vTrade Policy and Georgian Exports 
 
  1
                                                
1. Introduction: the export-led growth proposition 
The widely accepted hypothesis of export-led growth states that economic growth can 
be stimulated by encouraging exports. Such an outward oriented strategy became popu-
lar by the successful examples of the South-East-Asian growth miracle of the 1970s and 
1980s. Export-led growth is contrary to the strategy of import substitution which was 
popular in the 1960s. While import-substitution calls for protecting temporarily the do-
mestic market, export-led growth tries to use the forces of the world market to stimulate 
domestic development.  
The empirical evidence of the export-led growth proposition is backed by several 
theoretical arguments: First, foreign demand which supplements domestic demand 
stimulates domestic production. This is particular valid if domestic demand is restrained 
by anti-inflationary policy. Second, an outward oriented strategy fosters specialization 
which in turn leads to productivity gains from the reallocation of resources. In addition 
it brings closer contact to the world economy and thereby promotes learning by doing. 
andtechnology transfer. This is particular true, if intermediates are exported to multina-
tionals which control the quality and production processes of their suppliers. Third, in-
creasing export can loose the foreign exchange constraint which makes it easier to im-
port inputs needed domestically. Foreign trade can be viewed as a specific production 
technology which transforms exports into imports. The purpose of export is to finance 
needed inputs. Finally export-oriented policy mostly comes in tandem with the promo-
tion of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). In developing countries FDI is often 
directed towards industries which use the cheap local resources for export products.  
For all these reasons promoting export is seen tantamount to the enhancement of 
growth.
1 Therefore trade policy is an important element of economic policy. This is 
particular true if the trading partner as the EU also practices an outward oriented eco-
nomic policy. 
In Georgia, authorities seem to subscribe to the idea of export-oriented policy. The 
low import tariffs and the liberal domestic policy in recent years are just in line with 
such an approach. The plan that export growth should outstrip GDP growth in the next 
years is another indication of export-oriented policy.
2 The share of exports in GDP 
should climb to 40%. At present the openness of the Georgian economy, measured by 
trade (export + import) over GDP, is with about 90% not very high for a small country 
and lower than in most East-European countries. But the degree of openness increased 




1 Correlation between growth of GDP and exports does not say anything about the causality. However, 
statistical tests with Georgian data support the view that causality runs from exports to growth rather than 
the other way round. (UNDP, p. 86)     
2 Program of the Georgian government for 2008 – 2012: United Georgia without poverty, 2008, mimeo. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURGWorking Papers Nr. 272 
2. Trade policy 
The implementation of an export oriented policy has to consider the accession to for-
eign markets as well as the improvement of the cost and production conditions of the 
domestic export industry. Both aspects are involved in the negotiation of trade agree-
ments, which specify under which conditions the markets are reciprocally opened to the 
trading partner. Trade policy is not limited to the conditions of cross-border transac-
tions, as tariffs, customs rules etc., but it also covers issues of domestic economic pol-
icy. For example, the accession to WTO involves a set of internal domestic regulations, 
in particular on subsidies, which have to be fulfilled in order to enjoy the benefits of the 
most favored nation rule. Therefore, trade negotiations involve not only tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, but also legal provisions which regulate and form the markets. Protection 
of intellectual property, competition policy, or regulations in the financial sector is fore-
most of domestic concern, but these policies are also directly related to trade. In particu-
lar such regulations play a decisive role in the attraction of FDI and technology transfer.   
In trade negotiations every partner will look for concessions of the other in those 
fields where it has a comparative advantage. Georgia’s export potential probably lies in 
labour-intensive, rather simple products which do not show distinct advantages from 
mass production. Thus Georgia will be mostly concerned about the accession of these 
products to the European market. The opening of the EU market for agricultural prod-
ucts and labour-intensive manufactures would be the main interest of Georgia. On the 
other hand, highly industrialized economies like the EU, export mostly differentiated, 
technologically advanced products with distinct economies of scale. Thus, their interest 
will likely be on market accession of these products and accompanying services. The 
EU would stress the access to sophisticated markets as the financial markets as well as 
technology relevant aspects as the protection of intellectual property. For each partner a 
different set of markets is of special interest. 
At present EU grants Georgia GSP+
3 till the end of 2008 which allows almost tariff-
free and quaota-free exports to EU. For the future EU proposes a so-called “deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement”. “Comprehensive“ means that the agreement 
should apply to trade with a substantial sectoral coverage, i.e. it should be not limited to 
specific goods or services. “Deep” means that the agreement should go beyond tariff 
reduction to include non-tariff barriers and regulatory approximation in trade related 
issues. We will later return to these important extensions from a simple free trade 
agreement in more detail. 
                                                 
3 The Generalized System of Preferences + can be granted to vulnerable developing countries if they 
adhere to a number of international conventions. 
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3. Simple FTA 
A simple free trade agreement (FTA) aims to abolish tariffs. The costs and benefits of 
tariff-free trade can be traced rather simply in a standard economic framework. If tariffs 
are abolished revenues of the budget (tariff income) will decline. In addition, markets of 
domestic producers might loose market shares to foreign competitors, which could 
cause a reduction of domestic production in some sectors. The resources freed in one 
sector will be employed in other sectors in which the country specializes. The smooth 
reallocation of the resources, which is often of political concern, is however a precondi-
tion that the gains of trade materialize. The elimination of tariffs reduces domestic 
prices due to cheaper imports. This will affect the welfare in two ways. Consumers 
benefit directly from lower prices of consumer goods. As far as intermediate goods are 
getting cheaper domestic producers can reduce costs and might become more competi-
tive. As a result new export opportunities might arise. In addition, lower prices of capi-
tal goods might affect domestic and foreign investments.  
The qualitative enumeration of the items affected by trade liberalization does not 
provide a sufficient guidance for economic policy. The net effect of a FTA between EU 
and Georgia can only be assessed with the help of empirical models, which allow meas-
uring the size of the respective effects quantitatively. It should be noted that the results 
produced by these models are the final effects after all adjustments triggered by tariff 
reductions have worked out. The models state the cumulative outcome after about 3 – 5 
years. 
For tasks like this usually computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which are 
calibrated to the country considered, are used. Several generations of these CGE-models 
were developed. The simplest models assumed homogenous goods which are produced 
from labor and capital with constant returns to scale. The next generation took into ac-
count the existence of differentiated products which are traded on monopolistic markets. 
These models allow for increasing returns to scale which in reality prevail for quite a 
number of industrial products. The latest, third generation are dynamic CGE-models 
which incorporate inter-temporal decision by which they explicitly model investment 
decisions.  
Results of such simulation models are included in the feasibility studies which the 
EU commissions before entering negotiations with a prospective partner about an ex-
tended trade agreement. Studies of this kind were done for Georgia
4 as well as for 
Ukraine
5. In addition a study on EU-Georgia FTA was undertaken by UNDP (2007). 
All studies conclude that a simple FTA would only have minor positive effects for the 
EU-partner. The UNDP study as well as the CASE/GlobalInsight-study concludes that 
almost no increase of Georgian GDP could be expected in case of a simple EU-
Georgian FTA. The result is not surprising given that the tariffs are already very low 
and almost non existent for Georgian exports.  
                                                 
4 CASE/GlobalInsight (2008) 
5 CEPS/IFW/ICPS (2006) 
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Naturally, the results depend on the type of model. The model used in UNDP study 
assumes perfectly competitive markets and does not consider industries with increasing 
returns to scale. Although the model is called dynamic, the modeling of the investment 
decisions is rather sketchy. The EU-study is a static model but incorporates sectors with 
increasing returns to scale. 
If only the Georgian economy and export industry is considered, the choice of con-
stant returns to scale seems to be justifiable. Advantages of mass production and the 
differentiated products might not be pronounced in Georgian export production. As will 
be shown later, only few industrial processed goods are exported. The main export 
goods are minerals and agricultural products. At least as long as the export basket does 
not change substantially, increasing returns might be neglected. The EU commissioned 
CASE/Global/Insight study assumes however increasing returns for quite a number of 
sectors, including textiles, in which Georgia is an exporter.  
 
 
4. An extended FTA 
If a simple FTA provides no or negligible gains as the studies suggest, there is a good 
reason to consider an FTA+, i.e. an extended trade agreement.
6 This would go beyond 
tariff reduction and include the reduction of non-tariff barriers as well as domestic 
trade-related reform policy. Both above mentioned studies conclude that an FTA+ be-
tween EU and Georgia would largely increase the gains from a trade. According to the 
CASE/GlobalInsight study a deep and comprehensive FTA would cause over time, i.e. 
after all adjustments have worked out, a 7.6% higher GDP than without such an agree-
ment. This means that over the next five years annual GDP growth could be about 
1.5percentage points  higher in Georgia.  
Although it is widely acknowledged that issues of governance and regulations, which 
are covered by the word “deep”, are important sources of growth and well-being, it is 
quite difficult to assess them quantitatively, as all studies on the subject admit. It is not 
only that little is known how legal regulations enter the production and investment deci-
sions, but it is also extremely difficult to quantify even so simple facts as non-tariff bar-
riers. Therefore, the errors of calculating the effects of a deep FTA are necessarily lar-
ger than for studies on a simple FTA. One has to keep in mind that any quantitative as-
sessment in the following discussion of regulatory harmonization cannot be more than a 
ballpark estimate. 
A deep FTA will try to reduce non-tariff barriers (NTB) by harmonizing norms and 
regulations. The size of these barriers for exports into the EU is sometimes estimated as 
                                                 
6. While the simple FTA deals only with tariffs the more comprehensive FTAs include also non-traiff 
barriers, as well as issues of investment climate or regulations about competition etc. The scope of an 
extended FTA can vary depending on the country-specific needs.
 We will use the terms FTA+, deep and 
comprehensive FTA, and extended FTA synonymously. 
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high as an equivalent tariff of 20% for textiles and 40% for food.
7 In general NTBs are 
higher for agricultural goods than for industrial products. It is obvious that if NTBs are 
really as high as the given estimates there would be a great effect of removing them.  
A large part of NTBs are product standards and regulations. Mandatory standards in 
the EU apply only to safety issues, as the sanitary- and phytosanitary regulations on 
meat and other agricultural products. Products not complying with obligatory standards 
cannot enter the EU market. All other standards are voluntary but have nevertheless an 
important effect since they facilitate the market access. In many cases the demand for 
products that do not comply with the industrial standards in the EU will be nil.   
The aspired removal of NTBs can only mean the adoption of the EU-standards by 
Georgia. Thus, costs for compliance with the standards will be incurred by the Georgian 
economy. Cost come in different forms: The state has to enact new legislation or amend 
existing one, which needs staff and other resources. Probably training and capacity 
building are other measures which have to be financed. However the highest costs must 
be borne by the private exporters who have to adjust their products according to EU-
norms and standards. There are only few attempts to quantify these costs. One study 
finds that investment costs of 2 - 5% of total sales of the economy are needed to comply 
with technical requirements. These compliance costs are higher for agricultural products 
and primary metals and ores than for most industrial products. Estimates for the costs of 
total compliance in the agricultural sector in Poland and Lithuania were at 2 – 2.5% of 
GDP.
8 It was estimated that Switzerland has to spend 0.5 -1 % of total export revenue 
to overcome the NTB to the European Market.
9 In any case the cost of compliance can 
be significant, although it is almost impossible to make a general quantitative statement 
on this issue. 
                                                
It is noticeable, that the estimates about the foregone sales (profits) due to NTBs 
seem to be much higher than the estimated compliance costs. If adjustments at the level 
of the firm would be sufficient to overcome the NTBs it would have been done already 
since the resulting net effect is positive. This points to a significant potential of reducing 
NTBs other than compliance to norms and standards. Obviously many NTBs, as 
smoothening of bureaucratic procedures, recognition of certificates etc., cannot be over-
come by endeavors of an exporting firm alone. However, there are no estimates about 
the size of those NTBs, which demand joint action for its removal, and those which can 




7 See estimates and discussion in ENEPO: EU Eastern Neighbourhood: Economic Potential and Future 
Development, D25 Working paper on concepts and definitions of institutional development (harmonisa-
tion) and methodology of measuring them,  CASE Ukraine, 2007. 
8 CEPS/IFW/ICPS, 2006, p.58 
9 www.europa.admin.ch 
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4.1 Market-friendly environment   
The Georgian government liberalized the economy substantially in the last two years. 
These reforms of 2006 are reflected in the improvements in the “Doing business” rank-
ings of the World Bank.
10 A further strengthening of economic governance, fighting 
corruption and harmonization with EU-rules is believed to improve the investment cli-
mate of the economy. These aspects of a deep FTA should reduce the risk of investment 
by establishing stable and predictable rules of the game and a level playing field. As a 
result domestic and foreign investments increase. According to the CASE/Global In-
sight report the most important welfare and growth effect of a deep FTA are related to 
the additional capital accumulation. The estimated increase of GDP by 7.6% corre-
sponds to a 16% increase of the capital stock which implies reasonable capital elasticity 
between .4 and .5. 
The Georgian attempt to establish a business-friendly environment by its far reaching 
liberalization of 2006/2007 came into conflict with the EU agenda of legal harmoniza-
tion. At issue is the liberalization of the Georgian labor market which might conflict 
with some ILO conventions. Compliance to these and other international regulations 
were however the precondition of granting GSP+ to Georgia.
11 To comply with EU 
norms on social and labor issues Georgia may have to revoke partly its liberalization of 
the labor market. This highlights a general problem of the export of EU rules: namely 
trade facilitation through approximation to EU rules on the one hand and fostering the 
internal economic development on the other. It is not self-evident that the adoption of 
EU-policy rules is also the best country-specific development policy. 
A market-friendly environment which attracts investors will also promote exports if 
the FDI is geared to exporting industries. Two areas of FDI seem to be relevant in this 
context. Firstly, labor-intensive production might attract foreign investments to produce 
semi-finished goods for use as inputs in the production process in the home-country of 
the investor. The integration into the vertical production chain demands however low 
unit wage costs as well as sufficient and cheap transport possibilities. Both precondi-
tions are only partly fulfilled in Georgia. Labor productivity and supply of skilled labor 
is still low. Further, the country is rather remote from the EU-market. In a medium and 
long-term perspective policy can try to attract foreign capital for labor intensive produc-
tion by investing in education and infrastructure. 
Secondly, investments into services can enhance exports. This is obvious in the case 
of tourism. The transport sector is another potential exporter of services. If Georgia suc-
ceeds to become a commercial and logistic hub of the region it will sell the transport 
and logistic services of a transit country, as it is does already with the pipeline transport. 
 
                                                 
10 In regular surveys the World Bank tries to capture large variety of indicators which describe the ease to 
do business in the country. See: World Bank (2007) 
11 At present it is discussed whether the Georgian labour market liberalization breached some ILO re-
quirements. 
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5. The trade balance 
The trade deficit of Georgia is significant and increasing. Net imports are about 24% of 
GDP. Such a high deficit is sustainable only with sound financing. Otherwise it can 
easily lead to a destabilization of the whole economy. Therefore the reduction of the 
deficit in a medium term perspective is of overriding concern. The promotion of exports 
ranks high on the political agenda towards more balanced trade. Given the dependence 
on energy and other raw materials curtailing imports does not seem an option to solve 
the problem. 
 
Table 1   Balance of trade and its financing, million USD 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  QI  2008 
Trade balance   -444  -577  -846  -1.131  -1.861  -2.734  -814 
Factor  income  12 13 78 62  164  39 -81 
Current  transfers 217 180 414 359 524 689 172 
Migrants’ transfers  -5  -5  -1  2  16  45  3 
Foreign  investment  156 331 483 542  1.077  1.654  386 
Other capital flows  64  57  -129  165  81  307  335 
Source: National Bank of Georgia, BoP 
 
Table 1 shows the deficit in trade of goods and services and the sources of its financ-
ing. Surprisingly the financing of the Georgian trade deficit is only to a smaller part 
based on debt creation.  Georgian net imports are mainly financed by two sources: cur-
rent transfers and foreign direct investment (FDI). The non-debt creating capital flow of 
FDI does not only finance part of the trade deficit but it provides also new capital and 
technology. Therefore as long as these flows continue a substantial deficit can be sus-
tained.  
The contribution of current transfers includes significant government transfers which 
are grants, gifts or assistance from outside. This source of financing is likely to decline 
as the economy develops. Higher is the contribution from Georgians working abroad 
and sending money in their homeland. Workers’ remittances, an item of current trans-
fers, amounted to 240 million USD in 2007. Migrants’ transfers and part of “factor in-
come” should be also counted as contributions of Georgians living abroad. All forms of 
transfers from Georgians working abroad, which are together almost as high as ”other 
capital flows”, share with FDI the advantage of being not debt creating. Therefore de-
spite the huge trade deficit Georgia is still in a comparatively comfortable debt situa-
tion. At present, external debt of Georgia is less than 20% of GDP. 
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6. Export performance 
6.1 Data issues 
Before we look at the export performance of Georgia in some detail we have to address 
some data issues. Data on export of goods are available from the balance of payments 
(BoP), the Department of Statistics of the Georgian Ministry of Economics and through 
mirror statistics. However, the BoP data are only available as an aggregate and do not 
allow for a sectoral or country-wise breakdown of exports. Table 2 provides the data 
from all three mentioned sources.  
 
Table 2   Total export of Georgia, in 1000 USD 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BoP 603.334  830.555  1.092.111  1.472.437 1.666.526 2.104.143 
Dep. Stat.  346.000  465.300  646.900 865.454 936.172  1.232.896 
Mirror Stat  577.886  931.278  1.139.832 1.345.823 1.543.401   
Source: National Bank of Georgia, BoP, July 2008; Georgian Ministry of Economics, Department of Statistics; ICT 
(www.intracen.org) 
 
The data in the BoP, which are augmented by estimates for not reported trade, are 
based on the numbers from the Department of Statistics. These include shuttle trade 
which is not accounted for by the customs. The extent of underreporting is unclear. 
Since there are only small fees and no tariffs on exports but even a refund of VAT the 
motif of underreporting of exports is unclear. It might lay in avoiding any records with 
customs or fiscal institutions.  
Data from the BoP, which enter also the GDP calculation, look more comprehensive. 
Their reliability seems to be supported by the rather small differences between the BoP 
data and the mirror statistics which were calculated from the imports of 87 countries. 
However, this close resemblance of both time series results mainly by construction be-
cause the National Bank of Georgia uses mirror statistics to decide on the adjustment of 
the data from the Department of Statistics. 
Considering in more detail the trade data between Georgia and the EU, it becomes 
clear that the mirror statistics do not necessarily give a more accurate picture. This is 
revealed by a closer comparison of the Georgian data from the Department of Statistics 
and the mirror data from Eurostat. Georgia reports exports which are less than half of 
the respective imports reported by the EU (Table 3). 
 
Table 3   Georgian exports to EU-27, in 1000 USD 
  2005 2006 2007 
Georgian  data  216.756 225.354 268.530 
EU  data  345.447 590.931 655.575 
Georgian in % of EU data  62,7%  38,1%  41,0% 
Source: Georgian Ministry of Economics, Department of Statistics; Eurostat 
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The differences can be traced to only a few products. More than 60% of the 400 mil-
lion USD difference between the two data sets is due to EU imports of fuel which are 
not reported by the Georgian statistic, but are reported by Eurostat. According to EU-
data mineral fuels were by far the most important Georgian export good to EU. This 
systematic over-reporting in the EU-data was already detected earlier. A joint study of 
an EU-expert and the National Bank of Georgia concluded: 
“Georgia is not an oil producer, however due to its geographical positioning is in 
somehow involved in the transit of products belonging to chapter 27. International ship 
operators are coming to the port of Georgia for filling their tankers and it is probably 
at this moment that they made errors in customs declarations by indicating the oil as 
Georgian origin. This could explain the big mirror westbound discrepancy in product 
“271019” (Medium Oils).”
12 
Recent data suggest that the same problem still exists and gains in importance. 
Therefore, any analysis using EU-data should take into account that these data likely 
grossly overestimate the trade flows. These huge oil re-exports should be taken into 
account when the Georgian export performance is assessed. Since imports of Georgia 
are revised upwards in a similar fashion in the BoP, the net effect which enters the GDP 
calculations is less affected by this energy re-export. 
 
 
7. World exports 
The dynamics of exports are quite similar regardless of the data used. Georgian total 
exports grew in the last 5 years at an annual rate of 24%. Export growth shortly plunged 
in 2006 due to the Russian embargo on wine and mineral waters, but resumed again in 
2007. The export ratio (goods and services) increased from less than 25% at the begin-
ning of the century to almost 34% in 2005. In recent years the losses in the Russian 
market reduced the export ratio to 31.4%. Nevertheless, exports developed dynamically 
and contributed significant to domestic growth. 
However, the structural change has been moderate, as table 4 shows. Compared to 
2002 five new products entered the top 10 export products. Exports are still dominated 
by minerals, metals and metal waste. The trade disputes with Russia displaced wine 
from the top-10 exports in 2007. The exports of automobiles in this list depict the re-
exports of cars to neighboring countries. Thus, there are only few processed goods in 
the current export basket of Georgia. Cement, whose production capacity was expanded 
by FDI, might be an exception. 
                                                 
12 Venice Consulting (2006) 
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Table 4   Top 10 export products, in 1000 USD  
 2002       2007  
  Total 345.933   Total 1.232.896
8802  Other aircraft;   41.084 7202  Ferro-alloys  159.630
7204  Ferrous waste and scrap  36.482 7204  Ferrous waste and scrap  96.872
2204  Wine of fresh grapes  33.202 2603  Copper ores   79.213
7108  Gold unwrought   28.581 8703 Motor  cars  70.176
2201  Waters, natural   17.291 7108  Gold unwrought   69.392
7202  Ferro-alloys  15.502 0802 Other  nuts  65.122
1701 Sugar    13.563 2523 Cement  64.002
2603  Copper ores   13.157 2208  ethyl alcohol, spirits,   57.423
3102  Mineral  fertilizers,   12.037 3102  Mineral  fertilizers,   57.022
8803  Parts of aircrafts  11.477 7404  Copper waste and scrap  37.052
Items in bold italic figures appear in both years on this list. 
Source: Georgian Ministry of Economics, Department of Statistics  
 
For economic growth in the medium-term perspective a modernized structure of ex-
ports is even more important than the value of exports. On the one hand, one would 
expect that so called “distress exports” wither when the economy revitalizes after the 
breakdown. In times of financial hardship exports from stocks of existing goods, which 
can be easily sold at the world market, rise. In particular the exports of metal scrap and 
waste belong to this group. On the other hand a sign of reviving entrepreneurship would 
be the rise of new products which were not exported before. Therefore an increase in 
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Graph 1   Count measure of the variety of export products 
Source: Own calculations; Georgian Ministry of Economics, Department of Statistics 
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The range of export goods of Georgia is still limited and has not expanded much 
over time. The top 10 export categories listed in table 4 accounted for about 60% of 
total export in 2002 as well as 2007. A count of all exported products reveals a similar 
pattern. The variety of export products over time has increased only moderately. The 
differences in the level of the two series shown in graph 1 are due to different aggrega-
tion level of the underlying data. The visible increase in the number of exported goods 
in the last years might indicate some new dynamism. However this cannot be confirmed 
by other data, as discussed below. The jump in 2006 might just reflect more accurate 
collection and classification of export items by the customs. 
 
Table 5   Exports of goods and services, in thousand USD 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
goods 603.334  830.555  1.092.111 1.472.437 1.666.526 2.088.285
services 408.362  457.955  554.762 715.043 885.036  1.094.096
sum g + s  1.011.696  1.288.510 1.646.873 2.187.481 2.551.562 3.182.381
service % of total  40,4  35,5  33,7  32,7  34,7  34,4 
Source: National Bank of Georgia, BoP. 
 
In addition to the export goods there is a significant, although declining share of ser-
vices which contributes to total exports. In contrast to the merchandise trade the balance 
of trade in services was mildly positive over the period considered. The two big export 
items of services are transport, to which we return below, and tourism. The latter shows 
an increasing trend and had a strong positive balance of 200 million in 2007. 
The export potential of tourism in the medium range is quite significant but strongly 
dependent on the stability and security in the country. In addition, large investments in 
infrastructure from roads to hotels would be necessary to tap this potential. 
 
 
8. Exports to EU-27 
In 2006 the EU granted Georgia GSP+, which allows for tariff-free exports of almost all 
products. The overriding question is whether any effect of these trade preferences can 
be detected in the data. Moreover, quantifying the effect of GSP+ would be important 
for the present discussion about the prolongation of GSP+ and a more expanded FTA. 
The same analysis as before will be repeated for the Georgian exports to the EU-27. 
As was mentioned, such an exercise is plagued by inconsistencies in the two available 
data sets. According to Georgian data, exports to EU-27 increased in the period 2005 - 
2007 by 11.3%, while Georgian exports to the other parts of the word grew by 21.9%. 
There is, in particular in comparison to total exports, no export boom related to the 
GSP+ visible in the Georgian data. (see graph 2) If anything, export growth seems to 
have slowed after 2005. According to the Georgian data total exports to EU-27 are only 
twice as much as the Georgian exports to Turkey. 
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Graph 2   Georgian export to EU-27, in million USD 
Source: Own calculations; Georgian Ministry of Economics, Department of Statistics; Eurostat 
 
The picture is completely different, at first glance, if Eurostat data are used. EU-data 
seem prima facie to confirm a jump in Georgian exports after the abolition of most tar-
iffs in 2005. Compared to 2005, Georgian exports to EU increased by a staggering 32% 
per annum.  
However, half of the absolute increase of 200 million € in 2006 is due to exports of 
fuel, which were already identified as an ambiguous export item. Another 35.000 € of 
the 2006 export jump are due to the doubling price of copper ore. The remaining in-
crease in Georgian exports can be attributed to the sales of aluminum. These three prod-
ucts almost completely explain the increase in Georgian export to EU-27 in the period 
2005 – 2007. In the light of this decomposition of exports there is little support for an 
export enhancing role of GSP+. 
This conclusion is supported by a look on the change of the export basket. The num-
ber of products at the 4-digit level does not show any trend over time if we use the Eu-
rostat data (Graph 3). The exported variety has not increased after the introduction of 
GSP+. With slight variations around the average 148 product categories were exported 
to the EU in the years 2002 – 2007.  If the count measure is applied to the Georgian 
trade data, the variety is more volatile and shows an upward trend. But it is difficult to 
identify the granting of GSP+ as the cause for the increase of variety. In average the 
Georgian data show less export items than the EU statistic.  
The small changes in the composition of exports to EU is also confirmed if one looks 
at the top 10 exports to EU-27 which accounted in 2002 and 2007 for about 84% of to-
tal exports to the EU. At the 4-digit level seven out of ten products were the same in 
both years. As already mentioned, Georgian exports as reported by Eurostat are domi-
nated by fuel, which accounted in 2007 for 46% of total Georgian exports to EU. Only 
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at the end of the top 10 appear two machinery products (group HS 8). Neither techno-
logical upgraded product exports nor labor-intensive manufactures entered the Georgian 
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Graph 3  Variety of Georgian export to EU-27 
Source: Own calculations; Georgian Ministry of Economics, Department of Statistics 
 
In conclusion, we do not find an export enhancing effect of GSP+ in the data. This 
result can be interpreted in different ways. Firstly, although the GSP was designed to 
trigger a rather short term effect, the inertia of exporters might be greater than expected 
and adjustment needs more time. Secondly, the Georgian industry might as yet not have 
a sufficient export base to expand its sale on the demanding European market. Thirdly, 
in addition to these structural explanations it can also be the case that very high non-
tariff barriers prevent the expansion of exports despite the granted tariff reductions. 
 
 
9. Foreign direct investment, pipeline service, and processing 
trade 
FDI in Georgia surged in the last two years to more than one billion USD or 15 – 16% 
of GDP. (Graph 4) About a third of foreign investment in recent years was used for the 
construction of pipelines by foreign firms. The biggest investors are USA followed by 
Great Britain. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and even Russia contributed large amounts in 
recent years. Remarkable are the significant investments from the tax havens Cyprus 
and Virgin Island. The pattern is well known from other CIS countries to which flight 
capital of the region returns. 
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Graph 4   Foreign direct investment flows to Georgia, million USD 
Source: National Bank of Georgia, BoP 
 
The stock of FDI of about 5 billion USD is still small compared to other East Euro-
pean countries. However, if the recent flow of capital stabilizes, this will make a sig-
nificant contribution to the capital stock as well as to financing the trade deficit. At the 
moment investments in industry or agriculture are only about a quarter of total invest-
ment and therefore cannot have significant employment or growth effects. 
In terms of the export-led growth proposition such FDI should be attracted that uses 
the domestic resources for export production. This is in a particular sense true for in-
vestment in pipelines which use Georgia as  a transit country of energy transport. This 
export of transport services became quite relevant in recent years. The export value of 
pipeline transport, which is given in table 6, amounted in 2007 to 2% of GDP. 
 
Table 6   Export of pipeline service, in 1000 USD 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
44.224 46.017 48.338 51.119  106.640  203.650 
Source: National Bank of Georgia, BoP 
 
With the completion of further pipelines these export revenues can easily double in 
the next years. Given however, that the pipelines belong to foreign firms, the outflow of 
repatriated profits can rise accordingly. The share of pipeline investments in total FDI 
was declining in the last years. That trend might be reversed in future since there are 
still several projects for new pipelines over Georgian soil. 
It is not known how much of total FDI are aiming at the creation of Georgian export 
production. Since most FDI went into the banking and construction sector no significant 
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contribution to exports can be expected from these capital inflows FDI in the last years 
was mainly driven by the privatization. 
Georgia wishes to strengthen its role as a transit country for goods and energy. If for 
instance Batumi is gradually developed as a major centre of processing and transporta-
tion of fuel from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, this would increase the export of transpor-
tation services. Another endeavor is to expand the free industrial zone in Poti through 
container transport turnover of the sea port. 1.5 billion GEL investment should create 
20.000 jobs in this zone. The free economic zone should be developed by private inves-
tors who can lease the port for 49 years. The proposal of a free economic zone with tax 
breaks for the firms in the zone were criticized by the EU and other (on grounds of dis-
torting the level playing field. 
With or without foreign investment export production can be fostered by the so-
called processing trade. Raw materials or intermediate goods are provided by foreign 
firms to be processed in Georgia and re-exported afterwards. This type of processing 
trade plays a significant role in the industrial development of Eastern Europe, China, 
and South-East-Asia. Processing trade is mostly based on sharp differences in labour 
costs and exploits the cheap labor in the processing countries. However, subcontracting 
does not end here. As it happened in Eastern Europe, more and more technologically 
advanced processes are gradually outsourced to labor abundant countries. The example 
of India and other show the large potential to attract outsourcing of services such as 
programming, call centers, or book-keeping. Outsourcing by developed countries is one 
of the major possibilities of integrating a developing economy in the world-wide divi-
sion of labor. 
This trade is difficult to capture in the statistics. A subset of trade from outsourcing 
is the processing trade which is governed by specific customs regulations. Although this 
is only a small part of total outsourcing trade, data from EU show how significant it can 
be. Note that this trade does not exist between members of the EU because the exemp-
tion of processing trade from tariffs is not necessary for intra-EU trade. Therefore such 
trade of the Baltic States ceased with their accession to the EU in 2004.  
 
Table 7   EU-27 imports from outward processing trade, in 1000 Euro 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Turkey  3.013 2.297 3.153 6.539 3.327 3.619 2.623 
Romania 40.601 57.795  163.981 230.781 199.784 294.134 144.644 
Bulgaria 1.020 5.502 9.628  13.012  9.897  11.229  22.743 
Estonia 77.958  63.812  194.429  236.185  63.037  1  0 
Latvia  15.226 18.613 33.348 43.792 22.030  0  9 
Extra-EU  1.708.545 1.955.810 1.396.987 2.456.605 1.455.946 1.549.695 904.817 
Georgia  0 1  14  6 8 0 0 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As can be seen from the data in the table 7 Georgia does not participate in processing 
trade with the EU-27. As said, the potential of processing trade might be used more than 
the data reveal if low tariffs do not merit the utilization of the specific statistical regime. 
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But some processing trade, mostly textiles, is reported in the Georgian BoP statistics. 
Data show a rising trend which however stopped in 2007. 
 
Table 8   Georgian processing trade, in 1000 USD 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Export    20.017 39.854 23.607 50.203 76.163 31.803 
Import  18.392 39.042 20.368 49.926 35.581 27.274 
Balance 1.625  812  3.239  277  40.583  4.529 
Source: National Bank of Georgia, BoP 
 
 
10. Prospects for Export 
The Georgian authorities count on export as a source of future growth. In average real 
exports should grow about 13% annually while GDP growth is expected to be 8%.
13 
Agriculture should contribute 25% to total export in five years. Agricultural exports 
stagnated in the last 2 years, but are expected to grow strongly in the coming years.  The 
government wants to strengthen the role of the Black Sea coast as a centre for handling 
and transport of transit and other goods. This and expanding energy transport will in-
crease the export of services. Georgia plans to increase its net exports of electricity by 3 
times till 2012 compared to 2007. Finally, subsidized loans are available to exporting 
firms. 25 million GEL are earmarked to expand the export capacities. These govern-
ment targets over the next 5 years are difficult to assess against the past performance 
since the targets are given in real terms but there are no real trade data available for 
Georgia.
14 
Any attempt to relate the export prospects to the change of competitiveness is se-
verely hindered by the lack of data. The real effective as well as the real Euro exchange 
rate appreciated by about 15% in the last four years (Graph 5). However, to gauge how 
this development has been affecting the competitiveness and exports, one would need 
data on unit labor costs. Nominal wages more than doubled in the last 4 years while 
productivity measured by real per capita income increased only by 40%. But real per 
capita income may be a poor measure of productivity because of the large agricultural 
subsistence sector. At best unit labor cost remained constant in the recent past.
15 Un-
doubtedly there were significant improvements in the business climate, as measured by 
the “Doing business” indicators in the last years. Altogether however it is likely that 
exports have been hindered rather than enhanced by the development of the real ex-
change rate. Given the double digit inflation further appreciation is likely. Thus, exports 
will get little help from exchange rate policy. 
                                                 
13 All data are from the government program „United Georgia without Poverty“. 
14 In particular there is still no national account by end-use categories in constant prices. 
15 IMF (2008) 
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Graph 5   Real effective and real Euro exchange Rate of the Lari 
Source: IMF, IFS. 
 
To get some more insight into the potential growth of Georgian exports we consider 
now the statistical and simulations exercises available for Georgia. Based on the data of 
the last 10 years the earlier mentioned UNDP study concludes that “a 1% increase in 
EU income per capita or GDP should lead to a 7% increase in Georgian exports.”
16  
This would be a pretty high elasticity of Georgian exports on EU´s GDP. Given that 
EU´s GDP as well as its GDP per capita can be expected to grow by 1 – 2% annually, 
the predicted annual Georgian growth of exports to EU will be about 14 – 28%. The 
specification
17 in the quoted study renders the results very optimistic. If productivity 
improvements in the Georgian export industry and future reduction of trade barriers are 
added to these estimates, one would arrive at an even higher export growth to EU.  
The CASE/GlobalInsight study estimates that the reforms of 2006 will stimulate ad-
ditional exports of about 15% over a time span of about 5 years, i.e. due to these re-
forms Georgian total exports will be about 3 percentage points higher than without re-
forms. A simple FTA would have almost no additional effect on exports according to 
this study. A stimulus for exports can be only expected from a deep FTA with a com-
plete elimination of barriers to trade and far reaching domestic reforms.
18 In this case 
growth of Georgian exports might for a couple of years be 5 percentage points  higher 
than without such an FTA+.  Interestingly the highest export growth triggered by the 
                                                 
16 UNDP (2007), p. 82. 
17  GDP and GDP per capita are combined multiplicatively in the estimation model. 
18 The study distinguishes different extended FTAs with varying scope. The most comprehensive or deep 
FTA includes also measures to enhance the investment climate and governance. 
  17OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURGWorking Papers Nr. 272 
reforms is forecasted for textiles.
19 By construction of the CGE model the depth of dif-
ferent reforms, from simple FTA to a very deep FTA, does not affect the structure of 
exports. Those sectors that profit from the 2006 reform would also, however to a larger 
extent, profit from deep reforms and vice versa. 
The models assume, as it is usual, that imported and domestic products are similar 
but not identical. This so called Armington-hypothesis drives to a large extent the re-
sults. Two points not included in the model simulations should be mentioned because 
they might be relevant for the export performance. The harmonization of standards i.e. 
the legal approximation also makes domestic and foreign products more similar, less 
differentiated. In economic terms this will change the elasticity of substitution between 
foreign and domestic products. If this happens it will be easier for foreign products to 
conquer the domestic market. One of the assumptions of the UNDP study namely that 
“the effect of substitution of locally produced goods with imported goods should be 
very weak” (p. 86) will not longer hold if harmonization is considered.  A change of the 
ease of substitution between domestic and foreign goods as a result of a deep FTA is 
also neglected in the CASE/GlobalInsight study. The concerns of Georgian firms of 
coping with competitive pressure and market forces of EU firms might be an important 
point in a policy study that should clarify the feasibility of an integrated free market 
between EU and Georgia. At least from a political point of view, the speed and smooth-
ness of reallocation of labor which is laid off in import competing sectors is crucial for 
the design of the trade policy. 
With respect to exports the mentioned Armington condition is even more influen-
tial.
20 In models of this kind export growth can only happen by increasing the export of 
those goods that are already exported. The possibility of new export products, i.e. an 
increase in the variety of export goods, cannot be captured in these models. Due the 
neglect of the so called extensive margin of exports their potential might be underesti-
mated. Some studies suggest that the effects of the reduction of trade barriers are much 
higher if the creation of new export goods is allowed in the model.  
Given the small export base of Georgia one would assume that successful reforms 
would and should in particular stimulate new export products rather than the expansion 
of the existing ones. This is particular true if the existing export basket hardly includes 
any processed goods. As yet several industrial sectors of the Georgian industry stay 
outside the international division of labor. Export potentials remain still unused. A sig-
nificant increase in real growth would very likely coincide with significant structural 
changes in the Georgian export basket. Therefore more of the same cannot be the objec-
tive of export promoting policy but rather the discovery and utilization of new export 
products which can be produced competitively due to lower trade barriers and market 
friendly domestic policy.  
                                                 
19 This will however not happen in processing trade but is due to increasing returns to scale assumed for 
this sector. 
20 Cp. Fan (2008). 
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11. Conclusions 
The Georgian government tries forcefully to open its economy to the world market. 
Foreign investment and higher exports are needed to finance the needed imports. This is 
supported by the EU, which proposes within the European neighborhood policy a close 
cooperation and harmonization of trade related issues. The tariff- and quota-free exports 
to EU as yet did not improve the Georgian export volume or structure. While there are 
advances in the export of services this does not apply to good exports. They are still 
dominated by raw materials and some simple, hardly processed products. 
According to feasibility studies there are good chances that export and economic 
growth accelerate if non-tariff barriers are removed and measures for a better invest-
ment climate are continued. Georgia undertook already encompassing reforms in 
2006/07 to create a market friendly environment.  
Since traditional export goods may have only a low growth potential, larger export 
growth will demand a change in the export structure. New export goods using the com-
parative advantages have to be developed. Following the world wide trend of integrat-
ing into the world market as an supplier of parts and components for multinational firms 
seems to be an option. In this way Georgia can get involved in the processing of prod-
ucts and the export of intermediates, which govern an ever increasing share of world 
trade. The government should aim to enable Georgian firms to create new products 
which are demanded as intermediates by foreign buyers. In the beginning these would 
be likely rather simple labor-intensive products which, however, can be technologically 
upgraded over time. Close and enduring supplier-buyer relations lend themselves to 
exchange of technical, organizational and marketing knowledge which the Georgian 
export might use to enhance his products and production process.  
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